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THE UNREVIEW ABLE EXECUTIVE: 
KIYEMBA, MAQALEH, AND THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION 
Stephen I. Vladeck* 
If Lord Acton was correct that power corrupts,1 then it 
should come as no surprise that presidential power tends to 
corrupt presidents. Especially in light of the current and ongoing 
threat that transnational terrorism poses to our national security, 
there are insufficient incentives for presidents of any political 
stripe voluntarily to accept-let alone champion-constraints on 
their authority in the name of individual rights. I don't mean to 
condone this reality, of course, but merely to observe at the 
outset how unsurprising it is that the Obama Administration has 
continued many of the more controversial counterterrorism 
programs begun or expanded during the tenure of President 
George W. Bush, including initiatives heavily criticized by then­
Senator Obama during his presidential campaign.2 
From military commissions to governmental secrecy, from 
the detentions at Guantanamo, Bagram, and elsewhere to the 
increasing use of UAVs to attack-and kill-terrorism suspects 
around the world, one could fairly draw a number of descriptive 
comparisons between the national security policies of the forty­
fourth U.S. President and those of the forty-third. What's more, 
such comparisons have increasingly provided fodder for critics at 
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. My 
thanks to Heidi Kitrosser for the invitation to participate in this colloquy, and to Jillian 
Moo-Young for research assistance. In the _interest of full disclosure, I should note that I 
have co-authored amicus briefs in several of the cases discussed in this essay, including 
on the merits in support of the petitioners in the Supreme Court in Boumediene, in 
support of certiorari in Kiyemba II, in support of the appellees in the D.C. Circuit in al­
Maqaleh, in support of rehearing en bane in the D.C. Circuit in al-Bihani, and in support 
of the appellants in the Ninth Circuit in Mohamed. Needless to say, the views expressed 
herein are mine alone. 
1. See Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), 
quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 750 (14th ed. 1968) ("Power tends 
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.") . 
2. For a fairly thorough and even-handed overview, see Peter Baker, Obama's 
War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 17, 2010, at 30. 
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both ends of the political spectrum; an ever-growing number of 
conservative commentators have found the similarities 
hypocritical, and just as many liberal observers seem to be taking 
the analogous nature of the measures as a deeply disheartening 
reinforcement of the status quo. 
My own view, for whatever little it's worth, is that many of 
the descriptive similarities at the policy level are superficial, and 
belie far more fundamental distinctions at the constitutional 
level, where the current administration is far less wedded to 
claims of unilateral (and indefeasible) presidential power than its 
predecessors. Thus, the Obama Administration has all-but 
abandoned one of the hallmark arguments of the Bush 
Administration -that the President has inherent power under 
the Commander-in-Chief Clause of Article Il3 to take measures 
he deems appropriate during wartime, and that congressional 
attempts to constrain that authority, to the extent they even 
apply, are unconstitutional.4 
To similar effect, the current Administration has embraced, 
rather than objected to, arguments that international law (and 
international humanitarian law, in particular) have a significant 
role to play in circumscribing the scope of the President's 
authority to detain terrorism suspects-and even try them before 
military commissions.5 Thus, in al-Bihani v. Obama, in which the 
D.C. Circuit controversially concluded that the President's 
statutory detention authority is not meaningfully constrained by 
the laws of war,6 the majority's conclusion to that effect went, as 
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual Service of the United States."). 
4. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 950-
63 (2007) (describing and documenting the invocations of the "Commander-in-Chief 
override"). For the magnum opus on the scope of the Commander-in-Chief Clause 
(produced by two then-academics who are now senior lawyers in the Obama 
Administration's Office of Legal Counsel), see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, 
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb (Pts. 1-2), 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 941 
(2008). For one example of the current Administration explicitly disavowing the Article 
II argument, see Mohammed v. Obama, No. 05-1347, 2009 WL 4884194, at *3 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 16, 2009). See also Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(mem.). 
5. For an overview of this debate, and its relationship to arguments about the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. 61 (2007). 
6. See al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This conclusion 
is troubling insofar as it is difficult to square with the Supreme Court's own observations 
on the subject. See, e.g. , Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
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Judge Williams charitably described in his concurrence, "well 
beyond what even the government ha[d] argued."7 
And although the current Administration has, like its 
predecessors, vigorously defended the scope of the state secrets 
privilege, and has challenged a pair of Ninth Circuit decisions 
taking a more nuanced (and less deferential) approach to 
executive claims thereto,8 it has not challenged on constitutional 
grounds proposed legislation that would circumscribe the 
privilege-an objection that the Bush Administration raised 
repeatedly.9 
To be sure, these distinctions have tended not to produce 
different results in individual cases. Thus, the current 
Administration continues vigorously to defend on the merits the 
detention of those non-citizens still in custody at Guantanamo 
Bay, just as it continues to defend its authority to try certain of 
the detainees before military commissions. In addition, thanks to 
statutes like the Military Commissions Acts of 200610 and 2009,11 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 12 and others, vanishingly 
few areas remain in contemporary counterterrorism policy in 
which the President is operating in the face of clear 
congressional constraints. 
("[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate 
force' to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our 
understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles."); id. at 548--49 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (advocating a 
more substantial role for the laws of war in interpreting the President's authority under 
the AUMF). Indeed, as this essay went to print, seven of the nine active judges of the 
D.C. Circuit specifically dismissed that holding as dicta while otherwise denying 
rehearing en bane. See al-Bihani v. Obama, No. 09-5051, 2010 WL 3398392, at *1 (D.C. 
Cir. Aug. 31, 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., and Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel, Garland, 
and Griffith, J.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane). 
7. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing 
Appellees' Unclassified Brief at 23). 
8. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), 
vacated, No. 08-15693, 2010 WL 3489913 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2010) (en bane). The earlier 
decision, which the government has also contested in its briefing to the en bane court in 
Mohamed, was al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). 
An 11-judge en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit heard argument on December 15, 2009, 
and a decision remains pending as of this writing. 
9. See, e.g. , Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www. 
fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/ag033108.pdf. 
10. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
11. Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-614 (codified in scattered 
sections of 10 U.S.C.). 
12. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.). 
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As a result, the separation-of-powers disputes that 
characterized so much of the landscape of national security law 
during the Bush Administration have given way to cases in 
which the dispute centers on whether, as Justice Jackson 
famously put it, "the Federal Government as an undivided whole 
lacks power."13 Suffice it to say, though, that if one looks behind 
the description of the policies at issue in these cases and to their 
underlying legal foundations, profound differences do exist 
between the Obama Administration's and Bush 
Administration's approaches to executive power, almost all of 
which are, at least in my view, generally for the better. 
In the essay that follows, rather than elaborate upon these 
distinctions, I want to highlight one area in which, both on and 
beneath the surface, I actually do find disturbing similarities 
between the arguments of the Obama Administration and its 
predecessors vis-a-vis executive power: the proper role of the 
federal courts in detainee habeas cases. In particular, my thesis is 
that arguments against judicial power in habeas cases are 
effectively arguments in favor of executive power, since they 
presuppose that the merits of the petitions-whether the 
detention of the petitioner is legally authorized-are irrelevant. 
In other words, even though it is Congress in the current 
cases that has purportedly divested the federal courts of 
jurisdiction (or otherwise constrained their authority),14 and 
Congress that has purportedly authorized the underlying 
detention, the real significance of arguing against habeas review 
is that it is an argument against a vital check on the Executive's 
detention power. Indeed, congressional authorization for 
detention would hardly be necessary if, simply by virtue of the 
detainee's location or status, the federal courts lacked the power 
to hear his claims or to provide effective relief. Thus, this essay 
suggests that a heretofore underappreciated aspect of executive 
power is that of the anti-judicial (or "unreviewable") 
Executive-the idea that arguments against judicial power, 
especially in habeas cases, inevitably reduce to arguments in 
favor of presidential prerogative. 
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-37 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
14. See, e.g. , Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 5(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note) ("No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or 
any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which 
the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed 
Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of 
the United States or its States or territories."). 
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After laying out this thesis in Part I, Part II turns to three 
specific cases in which the Obama Administration has continued 
to contest the habeas corpus powers of the federal courts. The 
first is al-Maqaleh v. Gates, which raises the question whether 
the Supreme Court's holding in Boumediene v. Bush-that the 
Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas 
corpus15 -applies to individuals held elsewhere, especially at the 
"BTIF," the Bagram Theater Internment Facility in 
Afghanistan. Although a D.C. district court judge appointed by 
President George W. Bush held in April 2009 that non-Afghanis 
picked up outside of Afghanistan did have a right to pursue 
habeas relief in the federal courts, the Obama Administration 
fiercely contested that decision. As this essay went to print, a 
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit endorsed the Obama 
Administration's arguments, reversing the district court and 
holding that the Constitution does not require habeas corpus for 
non-citizens held at Bagram.16 
Whereas Maqaleh raises the specter of the unreviewable 
Executive in perhaps its starkest form, the Obama 
Administration has also defended a pair of 2009 D.C. Circuit 
decisions identifying narrow limits on the remedial powers of the 
federal courts even in cases in which, thanks to Boumediene, the 
Suspension Clause unquestionably applies. Thus, the 
Administration has both opposed certiorari to review and 
defended on the merits the D.C. Circuit's decision in "Kiyemba 
I," which held that the D. C. district court lacked the power to 
order the release of 17 Uighurs detained at Guantanamo (and 
held to be no longer detainable as enemy combatants17) into the 
United States.18 In light of developments that may lead to the 
mooting of the case, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. 
Circuit's decision in March 2010. Nevertheless, in the same brief 
in which it urged that the case had become moot, the Obama 
Administration continued vigorously to support the Court of 
Appeals' reasoning, as well.19 
15. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
16. See al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 605 F.3d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
17. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
18. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 
(2010) (per curiam) ("Kiyemba !"), opinion reinstated as modified, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
19. See Brief for the Respondents at 26-51, Kiyemba I, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (No. 08-
1234). 
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To similar effect, the Administration also defended the D.C. 
Circuit's even more sweeping decision in "Kiyemba II," which 
held that the D.C. district court exceeded its authority in issuing 
injunctive relief that would have required notice to the detainee 
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the detainee's transfer to 
a third-party country.20 As in Kiyemba I, the Administration's 
brief in opposition to certiorari in Kiyemba II suggested quite 
emphatically that these are matters best left to the discretion of 
the political branches in general, and to the Executive in 
particular.21 Whatever the merits of the government's reasoning, 
the Supreme Court appeared-however tacitly-to agree, 
denying certiorari in March 2010.22 
To be clear, my point in this essay is not to take substantive 
issue with the Obama Administration's arguments in these cases, 
even though, to be candid, I find them all deeply troubling (in 
Kiyemba II, especially).23 Rather, my goal is to suggest that, in 
comparing the Bush and Obama presidencies with regard to 
executive power, a focus on headline-grabbing topics such as 
military commissions, governmental secrecy, or electronic 
surveillance confuses superficial similarities with structural ones. 
On the whole, the Obama Administration has been far less 
unilateral in its approach to executive power-but with the 
important and troubling exception of the cases discussed herein. 
I. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE UNREVIEWABLE 
EXECUTIVE 
A. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AS A CHECK ON THE POLITICAL 
BRANCHES 
One of the more intriguing aspects of Justice Kennedy's 
opinion for the majority in Boumediene was its almost dogmatic 
focus on the relationship between the Constitution's Suspension 
20. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, No. 09-581, 130 
S. Ct. 1880 (2010) ("Kiyemba II"). 
21. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 12-21, Kiyemba II, 130 S. Ct. 
1880 (2010) (No. 09- 581). 
22. S.ee 130 S. Ct. 1880 (mem). 
23. Kiyemba II is perhaps the most disturbing of this triad because it is the 
decision most likely to have an impact beyond the important but limited universe of 
detainee habeas cases. As explained below, the D.C. Circuit's analysis, if allowed to 
stand, could have a significant (and detrimental) impact on the scope of a habeas court's 
power in more traditional extradition and deportation cases, as well. See infra note 81 
and accompanying text (noting the impact of Kiyemba II, and its inconsistency with other 
case law). 
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Clause and the separation of powers.24 In nearly a dozen distinct 
places, the Boumediene Court referred to the particular role that 
habeas corpus was meant to play in our system of checks and 
balances, a sentiment perhaps best captured in the following 
passage: 
The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by 
a means consistent with the essential design of the 
Constitution. It ensures that, except during periods of formal 
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the 
writ, to maintain the "delicate balance of governance" that is 
itself the surest safeguard of liberty. The Clause protects the 
rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of 
the Judiciary to call the jailer to account. The separation-of­
powers doctrine, and the history that influenced its design, 
therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the 
Suspension Clause.25 
None of this, of course, was new. The importance of habeas 
corpus at the Founding derived from the extent to which it 
served as a check on arbitrary executive detention, which 
Alexander Hamilton decried in Federalist No. 84 as one of "the 
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny."26 Thus, as 
Justice Kennedy explained in Boumediene, "The Framers 
viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental 
precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus 
as a vital instrument to secure that freedom."27 To that end, the 
Constitution's Suspension Clause expressly protected "the 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," authorizing its 
suspension only "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [when] the 
public Safety may require it. "28 Habeas was not about the rights 
of the detainees nearly as much as it was about the ability of the 
courts, federal and state, to use the writ as a means of checking 
the political branches in general-and the Executive in 
. 1 29 partlcu ar. 
24. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to 
Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 2107 (2009). 
25. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
27. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 
(2001) ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 
reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 
have been strongest."). 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
29. For elaboration, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the 
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In that regard, the Founders' understanding of habeas, as 
described by Justice Kennedy, closely resembled the prevailing 
understanding of the scope and purpose of the writ in England, 
where, as a recent study by Paul Halliday documents, King's 
Bench had increasingly come to use the writ to consolidate its 
power, first vis-a-vis other courts and tribunals, and ultimately at 
the expense of Parliament and the King himself. 30 Deliberately 
modeling off of the English experience, the Founders included 
habeas as the only remedy expressly guaranteed by the text of 
the Constitution.31 
B. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION AND THE 
SUSPENSION CLAUSE 
Although the role that the Suspension Clause was meant to 
play in our constitutional system is abundantly clear in 
retrospect, the relationship between the habeas corpus 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the Clause is far less 
so-and requires a bit of doctrinal and descriptive elucidation. 
Indeed, at first blush, it is not at all obvious how a statute taking 
away jurisdiction Congress was not compelled to confer from 
courts Congress was not compelled to create could violate the 
Constitution. 
As I've explained previously, "the constitutional problem 
raised by habeas-stripping statutes does not arise solely from 
their constriction of the jurisdiction of the Article III courts. "32 
Rather, it is a result of the effect of such statutes in conjunction 
with other statutes or lines of doctrine that constrain the ability 
of other tribunals to entertain such claims.33 
Put differently, the reason why the jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts over habeas petitions from federal prisoners so 
thoroughly implicates the Suspension Clause is because the 
lower federal courts are the only tribunals currently with 
Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2010). See generally ERIC FREEDMAN, 
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 36-41 (2001). 
30. See generally PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO 
EMPIRE 160 (2010). 
31. The Bill of Rights would add a second constitutionally-grounded remedy via 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
32. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and 
the District of Columbia, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 71, 74 (2008) (emphasis original). 
33. See id. at 78-80. In particular, I explained that the local courts in the District of 
Columbia would have the hybrid authority to issue common-law writs against federal 
officers, but for a statute that expressly deprives them of such power. See id. at 77-78 
(citing D.C. CODE§ 16-1901(b)). 
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authority to entertain such claims as an original matter. A pair of 
Supreme Court cases from shortly before and after the Civil War 
deny such power to the state courts,34 and Ex parte Bollman 
limits the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "original" habeas 
petitions to cases in which there is some underlying lower-court 
decision,35 so that the Court is effectively exercising "appellate" 
rather than "original" jurisdiction,36 at least within the meaning 
of Article III, section 2. Thus, constraints on the habeas 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts invariably implicate the 
question whether the Suspension Clause affirmatively protects a 
right to judicial review. 
The upshot of this analysis is that arguments against federal 
habeas jurisdiction are arguments in favor of effectively 
unreviewable executive detention. Thus, and notwithstanding 
the Madisonian Compromise or nineteenth-century Supreme 
Court decisions that have been read to suggest that Congress's 
power over the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is 
plenary,37 the Supreme Court in Boumediene invalidated section 
7(a) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 as applied to 
Guantanamo,38 entirely because it deprived the federal courts of 
jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions without 
providing an adequate substitute.39 
34. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 
(21 How.) 506 (1859). For a superb recent discussion of the background to and 
significance of these decisions, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael Collins, The Story of 
Tarble's Case: State Habeas and Federal Detention, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 141 
(Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009). 
35. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
36. As Justice Souter has helpfully explained, an "original" habeas petition "is 
commonly understood to be 'original' in the sense of being filed in the first instance in 
this Court, but nonetheless for constitutional purposes an exercise of this Court's 
appellate (rather than original) jurisdiction." Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas 
Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 153). 
37. See, e.g. , Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: 
Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 
2036-39 (2009) (rehashing arguments that Congress's power over federal jurisdiction, 
even in habeas cases, is plenary). 
38. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(e)(1)). 
39. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262-75 (2008). Justice Thomas 
recently suggested that the Court has in fact "left open the question whether statutory 
efforts to limit [federal habeas jurisdiction] implicate the Suspension Clause." Noriega v. 
Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1006 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari). It is incredibly difficult to reconcile such an assertion with Boumediene, which 
necessarily held that a statutory limit on federal habeas jurisdiction violated the 
Suspension Clause. 
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It bears emphasizing that claims by the government that the 
courts lack jurisdiction in habeas cases are seldom based on 
inherent authority.40 Because Congress has provided the federal 
courts with habeas corpus jurisdiction from their inception,41 it 
usually takes affirmative action by Congress to withdraw 
jurisdiction in habeas cases.42 As a result, the kind of "executive 
power" that is implicated when the courts' jurisdiction is 
challenged is not, at first blush, inherent or unilateral authority; 
quite to the contrary, it is authority that necessarily finds implicit 
(or explicit) legislative sanction in the statute purporting to 
remove jurisdiction. 
What is telling, though, is that the preclusion of jurisdiction 
renders entirely beside the point the question whether Congress 
has separately provided substantive authorization for the 
challenged detention. So long as the courts cannot reach the 
legality of the underlying detention, the only possible effect of 
the availability of substantive authorization vel non would be as 
it relates to a subsequent-and entirely retrospective -damages 
action claiming unlawful detention.43 Even though, at that point, 
the existence .of statutory authorization for the detention may 
matter a great deal, the odds of recovery for unlawful detention 
40. One relevant counterexample is a provision in the Executive Order creating 
military commissions promulgated by President Bush in November 2001. Section 7(b )(2) 
of the order provided that any individual subject to the order "shall not be privileged to 
seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such 
remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United 
States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international 
tribunal." Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non- Citizens in 
the War Against Terrorism, § 7(b)(2), 66 FED. REG. 57,833, 57,835-36 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
To my knowledge, though (and for good reason), this provision was never invoked. 
41. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)). 
42. One exception would be instances in which the courts interpreted preexisting 
statutory language to sweep more narrowly than was previously understood, as, for 
example, in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (holding that the federal habeas statute 
required petitioners to file their petitions in the district in which they were confined). See 
generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 275, 292-300 (2008) (explaining how the decision in Ahrens unintentionally 
precipitated a set of serious constitutional questions). 
43. This exact set of arguments has played out in a fascinating recent academic 
exchange over the Suspension Clause, and the specific question of whether a valid 
suspension of habeas corpus merely delays (until the suspension is lifted) judicial review 
of purportedly unlawful detention, or whether it serves to affirmatively authorize the 
prisoner's detention for the duration of the suspension. For the competing sides, compare 
Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006), and Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial 
Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533 (2007), with David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, 
Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59 (2006), and 
Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2008). 
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would still be incredibly long,44 and, more importantly, the 
putatively unlawful detention would already have ceased. 
Practically, then, arguments against federal habeas jurisdiction 
are arguments in favor of the unreviewable Executive's power to 
detain, whether pursuant to a statute, some other freestanding 
legal authority, or neither. 
II. KIYEMBA, MAQALEH, AND THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION 
Separate from its profound legal consequences, the 
Supreme Court's June 2008 decision in Boumediene also had an 
enormous practical impact, as dozens of cases that had 
previously been in a six-year-long jurisdictional purgatory have 
finally been able to proceed in the D.C. district court and D.C. 
Circuit.45 In the run of cases, the remaining issues after 
Boumediene have all gone to the merits. But a small handful of 
cases have raised distinct challenges to the power of the courts, 
and it is in those cases that the Obama Administration has most 
directly embraced the anti-reviewability arguments of its 
predecessors. 
A. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST JURISDICTION: MAQALEH 
One of the most significant questions that Boumediene left 
unanswered was whether the majority's conclusion that the 
Suspension Clause "has full effect at Guantanamo Bay"46 was 
based on analysis that was unique to Guantanamo, or whether 
comparable reasoning would also support extending the 
Suspension Clause to other extraterritorial U.S. detention sites, 
especially the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) in 
Afghanistan.47 The Bush Administration vigorously opposed any 
extension of Boumediene in a quartet of cases arising out of 
44. Cf Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en bane) (holding, in 
sweeping terms, that no Bivens remedy could be available for a non-citizen who alleged 
that he had been subjected to extraordinary rendition), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 
(2010). 
45. For a careful analysis of the voluminous body of post-Boumediene habeas 
litigation in the D.C. courts, see Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the 
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010). See also BENJAMIN WITTES 
ET AL., THE BROOKINGS INST . ., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE 
GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010). 
46. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008). 
47. The issue had arisen prior to Boumediene, but the matter was held in 
abeyance pending the Supreme Court's disposition of the jurisdictional issues raised 
therein. See al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 06-1669, 2007 WL 2059128 (D.D.C. July 18, 2007). 
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Bagram that were argued before Judge Bates in the D.C. district 
court on January 7, 2009, and resolved in a pair of decisions 
handed down three months later. 
In al-Maqaleh v. Gates, Judge Bates ruled that, applying 
Boumediene's analysis, the Suspension Clause should also have 
"full effect" at Bagram, at least where the detainee was not 
initially detained within Afghanistan.48 Although Bates also 
suggested that practical obstacles counseled against habeas 
review in cases arising out of Bagram where the petitioner was a 
citizen of Afghanistan,49 the effect of his analysis was to sustain 
jurisdiction in three of the four cases before him,50 and to grant 
the government's motion to dismiss in the fourth case.51 
The Obama Administration, which had briefly noted (in 
response to a query from Judge Bates) that it adhered to the 
Bush Administration's position in the district court,52 pursued an 
immediate appeal to the D.C. Circuit.53 And in their briefing to 
the Court of Appeals, the Administration argued forcefully for 
reversal-and against habeas jurisdiction for any of the Bagram 
detainees. Arguing that section 7(a) of the MCA continued to 
preclude statutory jurisdiction notwithstanding Boumediene, the 
government's brief offered three reasons why the 
petitioners' attempt to analogize Bagram to Guantanamo 
fails. First, unlike Guantanamo, Bagram Airfield is located in 
a distant and active war zone. Second, Bagram has been in 
existence for only a short time, was never part of, or carved 
out of, U.S. territory to remain under de facto U.S. 
sovereignty separate and apart from the sovereignty of the 
nation in which the base is situated, and is not intended to 
serve as a permanent facility to advance independent U.S. 
interests. Third, Bagram serves the military mission of 
strengthening Afghan sovereignty, and the government must 
therefore take into account the views of our allies (most 
prominently the Afghan government, but also the many other 
48. al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) . 
49. Id. at 230-31. 
50. Seeid. at 232-33. 
51. See Wazir v. Gates, 629 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009) . 
52. See al-Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 210 ("Because of the change in the 
Presidential Administration, the Court on January 22, 2009 invited respondents to notify 
the Court whether they intended to refine the position that they had taken to date. On 
February 20, 2009, respondents informed the Court that 'the Government adheres to its 
previously articulated position. "') . 
53. See al-Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009) (certifying the 
issues presented in al-Maqaleh for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) , and 
granting a stay pending appeal) . 
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nations whose troops are stationed at Bagram). Unlike at 
Guantanamo, where our allies are many miles away and the 
Cuban government exerts no influence on the military 
mission, at Bagram the United States needs the cooperation 
of both the Afghan government and its coalition allies to 
achieve its mission: to defeat the common enemies of 
Afghanistan and the United States and, by doing so, to 
restore full control of the country to the Afghan 
54 government. 
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In short, the heart of the Obama Administration's argument 
(like the Bush Administration position that it inherited) was that 
Boumediene was a sui generis decision, limited to the exceptional 
and unique physical, legal, and practical circumstances of 
Guantanamo, and that there were compelling reasons not to 
extend its analysis of the Suspension Clause to Bagram.55 A 
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit unanimously accepted that 
position in May, 2010, ruling that the practical obstacles were too 
great to justify extending the protections of the Suspension 
Clause to non-citizens at Ba gram -even if they were not picked 
up in, or citizens of, Afghanistan.56 
B. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST REMEDIAL POWER: KIYEMBA I 
Although Maqaleh is the only detainee case thus far in 
which the Obama Administration has expressly embraced 
arguments against the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, it has also endorsed a pair of decisions by the D.C. 
Circuit suggesting that, even where the federal courts do have 
su�je�t-matt�r jurisdiction, th� sco_pe �f �heir 
5p
owers to fashion 
rehef m detamee habeas cases is qmte limited: 
In Parhat v. Gates, a petition to review a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal ("CSRT") resolved just over one week after 
54. Reply Brief for the Respondents-Appellants at 4, al-Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-
5265 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 16, 2009). 
55. Indeed, as an amicus brief in support of the Petitioners-Appellees (that I co-
authored) noted, many of the Obama Administration's arguments about the obstacles 
Bagram presented for habeas litigation were eerily similar to arguments the Bush 
Administration had made about the obstacles Guantanamo presented for habeas 
litigation - arguments that, the brief suggested, practice has since decisively repudiated. 
See Brief for Non-Governmental Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, 
al-Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 6, 2009). 
56. See al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
57. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1880 (2010) ("Kiyemba II"); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 
130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam) ("Kiyemba !"), opinion reinstated as modified, 605 
F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
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Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit had concluded that the 
government lacked the authority to detain Uighurs-members 
of a Turkic Muslim minority group from the Xinjiang province near China's western border-as "enemy combatants."5 In light 
of the government's decision not to challenge the Parhat ruling,59 
the detainees subsequently filed habeas petitions, arguing that, 
given the absence of authority for their continued detention, 
they were entitled to be released. Moreover, because they could 
not be repatriated to China, and because it appeared that there 
was no third-party country willing to take them, the Uighurs 
argued that they were specifically entitled to release into the 
United States, if no other option was immediately available. 
In October 2008, D.C. District Court Judge Ricardo Urbina 
granted the Uighurs' petitions,. ordering the government to 
produce the detainees in his courtroom in order to determine 
what conditions should be placed upon their release.60 The 
government successfully obtained an immediate stay of Judge 
Urbina's decision and a stay pending appeal, and the D.C. 
Circuit heard argument just under seven weeks later. At issue, 
the Bush Administration's Justice Department argued, was the 
plenary power that the political branches exercised over 
immigration. Thus, although the petitioners were protected by 
the Suspension Clause in light of Boumediene, the federal courts 
lacked the power to order their release into the United States. 
Given that there was no other country then in a position to take 
all of the Uighurs, the government's argument, in effect, was that 
the Uighurs had received all the relief that the courts had the 
power to provide, even though they remained in U.S. custody at 
Guantanamo. 
In Kiyemba I, issued in February 2009, the D.C. Circuit 
agreed.61 Relying heavily on a pair of Supreme Court immigration 
decisions from the 1950s,62 the court concluded that the decision 
whether to admit a non-citizen into the United States was purely 
for the executive branch, and that no statute or constitutional 
provision -including the Due Process Clause, which the court 
58. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) . 
59. Because Farhat was a statutory appeal as provided by the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, see id. at 835, the subsequent 
habeas petitions were necessary because the D.C. Circuit had no authority in the context 
of its Farhat decision to order release. 
60. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) . 
61. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d 1022. 
62. The two cases are Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953) ; and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) . 
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concluded did not apply to the Guantanamo detainees 
notwithstanding Boumediene63 - "expressly authorized" the courts 
to override that prerogative.64 
Although all of the briefing and arguments before the D.C. 
Circuit took place on the Bush Administration's watch, the 
Obama Administration subsequently opposed certiorari when 
the Uighurs petitioned for it,65 and thoroughly defended at least 
large swaths of the Court of Appeals' decision in its merits brief 
after the Court granted review.66 Thus, as the brief opposing 
certiorari argued, the Uighurs had already obtained all of the 
relief that the courts could provide, and Mezei and Knauff 
suggested that the courts are otherwise barred from interfering 
with the Uighurs' lawful exclusion from the United States.67 
Moreover, although the government's brief on the merits 
concluded by suggesting that intervening developments had 
effectively mooted the Uighurs' cases, that suggestion came after 
38 pages of argument defending Judge Randolph's opinion for 
the D.C. Circuit. As the brief argued, 
To permit the habeas court to grant such extraordinary relief 
would be inconsistent with constitutional principles governing 
control over the Nation's borders. As this Court has long 
affirmed, the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign 
prerogative vested in the political Branches, and "it is not 
within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized 
by law, to review [that] determination." Congress has 
exercised that power by imposing detailed restrictions on the 
entry of aliens under the immigration laws, as well as specific 
restrictions on the transfer of individuals detained at 
Guantanamo Bay to the United States. In light of these 
statutes and constitutional principles, neither Boumediene nor 
the law of habeas corpus justifies granting petitioners the 
relief they seek. And the Due Process Clause does not confer 
a substantive right to enter the United States in these 
circumstances. 68 
63. See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1026. 
64. Seeid. atl026-27. 
65. See Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234). 
66. See Brief for Respondents, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per 
curiam) (No. 08-1234). 
67. See Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 12-15, Kiyemba I (No. 08-1234). 
68. See Brief for Respondents at 11-12, Kiyemba I (No. 08-1234) (alteration in 
original; citation omitted). 
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To be fair, as the last line of the above quote suggests, the 
Obama Administration did not make as much out of the D.C. 
Circuit's conclusory due process holding as they otherwise might 
have (either in their briefing to the Supreme Court in Kiyemba I 
or in other Guantanamo habeas cases).69 But the core of the 
argument-that the federal courts lack the power to effectuate 
the release of a detainee held outside the territorial United 
States when there is no obvious place to send them -replicates 
the heart of the D.C. Circuit's analysis. 
In March 2010, the Supreme Court avoided the merits by 
taking up the Obama Administration's suggestion that the 
intervening change in circumstances had all-but mooted the 
petitioners' claims. As the Court's terse per curiam decision 
noted, 
[E]ach of the detainees at issue in this case has received at 
least one offer of resettlement in another country. Most of the 
detainees have accepted an offer of resettlement; five 
detainees, however, have rejected two such offers and are still 
being held at Guantanamo Bay. 
This change in the underlying facts may affect the legal issues 
presented. No court has yet ruled in this case in light of the 
new facts, and we decline to be the first to do so.70 
Thus, the Court vacated the D.C. Circuit's decision in 
Kiyemba I, and remanded for the Court of Appeals to 
"determine, in the first instance, what further proceedings in that 
court or in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for 
the full and prompt disposition of the case in light of the new 
developments. "71 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 
suggestion (along with the implications of the fact that it had 
vacated the original decision), the same panel of the D.C. Circuit 
reached the same result on remand for effectively the same 
reasons, concluding that the change in circumstances had no 
bearing on the original analysis.72 
69. Indeed, and notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit's analysis, the government's 
merits brief in Kiyemba I specifically asserted that, " [f]or purposes of this case, the 
question is not whether petitioners have any rights under the Due Process Clause while 
they are at Guantanamo Bay." Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
70. Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) (per curiam). 
71. Id. 
72. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 U.S. F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). But 
see id. at 1048-52 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that the change in 
circumstances provided a narrower ground on which to deny relief). 
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C. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EQUITABLE POWERS: 
KIYEMBAil 
619 
The last case in this trilogy was actually the first to be filed, 
dating back to requests by nine of the Uighurs in 2005 to an 
injunction requiring the Government to provide 30 days' notice 
to the district court and to counsel before transferring them from 
Guantanamo. The district court granted the requested relief in a 
pair of orders issued in September 2005, only to have the 
jurisdictional morass caused by the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (which was 
finally resolved in Boumediene) forestall further consideration 
until the fall of 2008.73 And while the district court's October 
2008 decision in Kiyemba I would have mooted the injunction 
had it been affirmed, the D.C. Circuit's reversal of that decision 
the following February reinvigorated both as a practical and 
legal matter the questions raised in the case, now referred to as 
"Kiyemba II." 
In a supplemental brief filed in September 2008, the Bush 
Administration's Justice Department offered two distinct 
theories for why the district court's injunction could not be 
sustained. First, notwithstanding Boumediene, the government 
maintained that section 7(a) of the MCA divested the federal 
courts of jurisdiction over the detainees' claims. Distinguishing 
the Supreme Court's analysis in Boumediene, the government 
reasoned that the kind of relief sought by the petitioners-and 
imposed by the district court-fell outside of the scope of habeas 
corpus protected by the Suspension Clause. As such, section 
7(a)'s removal of jurisdiction did not raise any constitutional 
concerns. 74 
In the alternative, the government argued, even if the courts 
had statutory jurisdiction, the relief ordered by the district court 
exceeded the court's equitable authority, especially in light of 
the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Muna[ v. Geren.75 
Specifically, the government's brief cast Muna[ as barring the 
courts from second-guessing the President's determination that 
73. See, e.g. , Kiyemba v. Bush, 219 Fed. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissing the 
case for lack of jurisdiction). 
74. See Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Kiyemba II") (Nos. 05-5487, 05-5489). 
75. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008) (holding that, although the federal courts have 
jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by U.S. citizens detained in Iraq, the 
government's assurance that the detainees did not face torture if transferred to Iraqi 
custody precluded the petitioners from prevailing on the merits). 
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the petitioner did not credibly fear torture, and thereby 
precluding injunctive relief to bar the detainee's transfer to a 
third-party country.76 
On the merits, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government's 
first contention -that the petitioners' claims fell outside the core 
of the Suspension Clause and were therefore not 
unconstitutionally precluded by section 7(a) of the MCA. A 
divided majority of the three-judge panel, however, 
wholeheartedly endorsed the government's second argument, 
concluding that " [o]ur analysis of [the petitioners'] claims is 
controlled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Munaf."77 
As Judge Ginsburg explained, 
The Supreme Court's ruling in Muna/ precludes the district 
court from barring the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee on 
the ground that he is likely to be tortured or subject to further 
prosecution or detention in the recipient country. The 
Government has declared its policy not to transfer a detainee 
to a country that likely will torture him, and the district court 
may not second-guess the Government's assessment of that 
likelihood. Nor may the district court bar the Government 
from releasing a detainee to the custody of another sovereign 
because that sovereign may prosecute or detain the transferee 
under its own laws.78 
The Court of Appeals therefore held that the district court 
lacked the authority to require notice or a hearing prior to one 
of the petitioners' transfer to an as-yet-unspecified third-party 
country,79 even though, as Judge Griffith explained in dissent, 
[T]he Muna/ petitioners knew in advance that the 
government intended to transfer them to Iraqi authorities and 
had the opportunity to demonstrate that such a transfer would 
be unlawful. There was no need for the Muna/ Court to 
consider an issue at the center of this dispute: whether notice 
is required to prevent an unlawful transfer. In considering the 
Muna/ petitioners' request to enjoin their transfers, the 
district court [there] had the benefit of competing arguments 
76. Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 23-25, Kiyemba II. 561 F.3d 509 (Nos. 
05-5487, 05-5489). 
77. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514. 
78. Id. at 516. 
79. Judge Kavanaugh added a lengthy concurrence explaining why he believed the 
petitioners' claims were patently without merit, and responding more directly to Judge 
Griffith's partial dissent. See id. at 516-22 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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from the petitioners and the government for each specific 
80 transfer. 
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Thus, the Kiyemba II majority's analysis would seem to 
preclude any federal court in any case in which an individual 
seeks to challenge his transfer to another country (including 
extradition and deportation cases, for example) from second­
guessing the executive branch's determination (or the other 
country's diplomatic assurance) that the detainee does not face 
h. f 81 torture upon 1s trans er. 
Perhaps because of those disturbing implications, the D.C. 
Circuit's denial of the detainees ' petition for rehearing en bane 
was over three dissenting votes.82 In November 2009, the 
detainees filed a petition for certiorari, and the Obama 
Administration's opposition, filed in February 2010, again 
defended the D.C. Circuit on the merits. Specifically, the 
government's opposition to certiorari stressed, as relevant here, 
that (1) "there is no basis for believing that petitioners likely 
would be tortured by any country that will receive them";83 (2) as 
such, "the court of appeals correctly held that this case 'is 
controlled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Munaf ";84 
(3) the petitioners' attempts to distinguish Muna[ were without 
merit;85 and ( 4) "this case does not raise any issue about whether 
a habeas corpus remedy is available to enjoin a detainee's 
transfer to another country when the receiving country would 
continue to detain the individual on behalf of the United States," 
because the petitioners had failed adequately to preserve that 
argument before the D.C. Circuit.86 
80. See id. at 526 (Griffith, J. , concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
81. But see Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2228 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring) 
("[N]othing in today's opinion should be read as foreclosing relief for a citizen of the 
United States who resists transfer, say, from the American military to a foreign 
government for prosecution in a case [where the executive branch decides to transfer a 
detainee notwithstanding its conclusion that the detainee is likely to be tortured] , and I 
would extend the caveat to a case in which the probability of torture is well documented, 
even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it."); Khouzam v. Att'y Gen., 549 F.3d 235 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (holding, after Munaf, that an alien was denied due process because he was not 
given notice and a full and fair hearing prior to his transfer to Egypt, even though the 
government had received diplomatic assurances from the Egyptian government that the 
alien would not be tortured). 
82. See Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 509 n.** (noting the dissents of Judges Rogers, 
Tatel, and Griffith). 
83. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 
1880 (2010) (No. 09-581). 
84. Id. at 19. 
85. Seeid. at 21-23 
86. Id. at 23-24. 
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Notwithstanding its vacatur three weeks earlier of the D.C. 
Circuit's decision in Kiyemba I,87 the Supreme Court on March 
22, 2010 denied certiorari in Kiyemba II without explanation, 
leaving intact the lower court's decision.88 Thus, although 
Maqaleh raises perhaps the most obviously "jurisdictional" 
question of the post-Boumediene cases, Kiyemba II may have 
the most sweeping implications outside the hyperspecific subset 
of terrorism detention cases, for it is based on a far more 
generalized view of the scope of a federal district court's powers 
in a habeas case. And to the extent that the Obama 
Administration has thus far defended the D.C. Circuit's opinion, 
it is, yet again, arguing for broader executive authority at the 
expense of the judiciary. 
III. CONCLUSION: HABEAS AND THE UNREVIEWABLE 
EXECUTIVE 
It seems increasingly likely that none of these three cases 
will ever produce decisions on the merits from the Supreme 
Court.89 Already as of this writing, the Obama Administration 
appears to have successfully mooted Kiyemba I (and, perhaps 
indirectly, Kiyemba II) by arranging for the transfer of each of 
the Uighurs to a third-party country.90 And since, if confirmed, 
Justice Kagan would likely have to recuse from considering 
Maqaleh (which would leave at most four possible votes for 
reversal), it also appears that the Supreme Court will not have 
the final word on that subject either. As a result, the Obama 
Administration's role in these cases may well turn out in 
hindsight to have been decidedly minor, and not part of the 
broader historical portfolio of its approach to executive power. 
But for the time being, as these cases remain live (or at least 
relatively fresh in our memories), the similarities between the 
Obama Administration's arguments and those made by the Bush 
87. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). 
88. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (mem.). 
89. In that sense, these three cases may join other significant challenges to post-
9/11 counterterrorism policies that were successfully mooted prior to (and perhaps in 
order to defeat) Supreme Court review. See, e.g. , al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 
(2009) (mem.); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (mem.). For a more general 
discussion of the significance of the Court's decisions "not to decide" these cases, among 
others, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the 
Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 913-17 (2009) (book review). 
90. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilbur & Peter Finn, Switzerland to Resettle Uighur 
Brothers from Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2010, at AlO, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/02/03/ AR2010020302417 .html. 
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Administration cannot be gainsaid. Arguments against the 
power of the federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from 
individuals in federal custody, or to be able to fashion 
appropriate relief in cases in which the petitioners prevail on the 
merits, are inherently arguments in favor of the Executive-far 
more so than defending these cases on the substance of the 
government's authority. I will save for another day my own view 
of the merits of these cases.91 But what seems abundantly clear 
for present purposes is that, especially in light of Boumediene, 
the merits should be left to the courts, and not to the President, 
no matter his politics. 
91. For the extent to which the D.C. Circuit's recent decisions in these (and other) 
detention cases are inconsistent with the Founders' understanding of the Suspension 
Clause, see Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Feb. 2011) (reviewing HALLIDAY, supra note 30). 
